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FOREWORD: WESTERN STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
G. ALAN TARR* and ROBERT F. WILLIAMS**
It has been more than a quarter century since state supreme courts-both in the
Western states and elsewhere-began to rediscover their states' declarations of
rights and confer greater protections than are available under current interpretations
of the United States Constitution.' It is now commonplace to attribute this new
judicial federalism to the anticipated/dreaded/welcomed erosion of Warren Court
rulings on civil liberties by the Burger Court.2 What is less recognized is the marked
effect that this path to the rediscovery of state constitutions has had on our
understanding of those documents. First, the new judicial federalism focused
attention on one part of the state constitution, the state declaration of rights, rather
than on the entire document. Even when scholars and litigators looked beyond the
confimes of the declaration of rights, as occurred in school-finance litigation, they
did so in the service of rights, transforming state-responsibility provisions into
rights guarantees. 3 Second, proponents of the new judicial federalism approached
the rights guarantees in state constitutions in terms of how judges should interpret
them, looking to state courts (as they had to federal courts) as the engine of
constitutional reform. Third, in addressing the interpretation of state constitutions,
scholars of the new judicial federalism viewed state constitutions in a vertical relational context, tending to read state provisions in view of their relation to analogous
federal provisions.4 Thus, an extensive literature developed about the conditions
under which state courts were justified in diverging from Supreme Court interpretations of analogous federal provisions.5 Finally, perhaps because of the narrow
focus of research on the new judicial federalism, this research remained divorced
from the broader body of constitutional law research, with a consequent loss in
stature and in intellectual excitement.6
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1. For overviews of the new judicial federalism and its consequences, see G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial
Federalismin Perspective,72 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1097 (1997); and Robert F. Williams, Foreword:Looking
Back at the New JudicialFederalism'sFirstGeneration,30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii (1996).
2. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The PoliticalDynamic of the "New JudicialFederalism",2 EMERGING ISSUES
ST. CONST. L. 233, 235 (1989).
3. For overviews of the school-finance litigation, see Symposium: Investing in Our Children's Future:
School FinanceReform in the '90s, 28 HARV.J. ON LEGiS. 293 (1991); and G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING, ch. 11 (1998).
4. Patterns of interaction between state and federal courts and among state courts have been described as
vertical judicial federalism and horizontal judicial federalism, respectively. See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNEIA
ALDis PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 5 (1988).
5. See Hans A. IUnde, EPluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L REV. 165 (1984);

Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning
and Result, 35 S.C. L REV. 353 (1984); and Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing

Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in IndependentState ConstitutionalRights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1015 (1997).
6. See G. Alan Tarr, ConstitutionalTheory and State ConstitutionalInterpretation,22 RUTGERS L J. 841
(1992).
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These comments are not meant as criticism--new fields of inquiry cannot spring
forth fully developed. Nevertheless, the best current research on state constitutionalism reveals that the field has been transformed. This Symposium on the
constitutions of the Western states both reflects this transformation and contributes
significantly to what is now a rapidly advancing field of study. The editors of the
New Mexico Law Review are to be commended for the outstanding set of articles
they have collected for this Symposium examining Western state constitutions at
the dawn of the twenty-first century.
Although current research continues to address how judges should interpret state
constitutions, most of the legitimacy concerns associated with state judges'
development of state rights guarantees have been resolved.7 Thus, in recent years,
scholars began to explore alternative approaches to state constitutional interpretation, linking their research to the constitutional theory literature that has dealt with
the interpretation of the Federal Constitution.' Professor Rachel Van Cleave's fine
contribution to the symposium demonstrates the benefits of this connection.9 At the
same time, her article reveals why distinctive features of state constitutions, such
as the ease and frequency of their amendment, and the different eras in which they
were adopted, require a distinctive approach to their interpretation.' ° This is
particularly true for Western state constitutions, many of which were drafted over
a century after the Federal Constitution and thus reflect a quite different
understanding of constitutional design and of politics." The articles by one of the
present authors, Robert Williams, 2 and by Professor Michael B. Browde,' 3 examine
the rights adjudication issue in the context of one specific Western state: New
Mexico. The new judicial federalism was in many ways fueled from the West, with
California 4 and Oregon 5 making early and sustained contributions to the increase
in state constitutional rights protections.
The distinctiveness that Professor Van Cleave has highlighted has emerged as a
major theme in state constitutional studies, as scholars have directed their attention

7. See sources cited supra note 5.
8. See Tart, supra note 6, and Roundtable: Responses to James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS L REV. 927 (1993).
9. See Rachel A. Van Cleave, State ConstitutionalInterpretationand Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV. 199
(1998).
10. For further treatment of these themes, see G. ALAN TAR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTrIUTONS ch.
1(1998).
11. Leading sources on Western constitutionalism include Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional
Tradition Revisited: PreliminaryObservations on State Constitution-Makingin the Nineteenth-Century West, 25
RUTGERS L J. 945 (1994); DAVID A. JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST: CAIIFORNIA, OREGON, AND NEVADA,
1840-1890 (1992); GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING: 1850-1912 (1987);
and JOHN D. HICKS, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE NORTHwEST STATES (1924).
12. See Robert F. Williams, New Mexico State ConstitutionalLaw Comes of Age, 28 N.M. L REV. 379
(1998).
13. Michael B. Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Conversation Over New Mexico's State
ConstitutionalRights Jurisprudence,28 N.M. L REV. 387 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism:Both Liberaland Conservative, 63 TEX. L REv. 1081
(1985).
15. See, e.g., David Schuman, A FailedCritiqueof State Constitutionalism,91 MICH. L REV. 274 (1992),
and David Schuman, Advocacy of State ConstitutionalLaw Cases:A Reportfrom the Provinces,2 EMERGING
ISSUES ST. CONST. L 275 (1989).
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beyond declarations of rights to look at state constitutions as a whole. One
distinctive feature of state constitutions is that they tend to address a wider range
of topics than the Federal Constitution, serving not only as a framework for
governing but also as an instrument of governance. The regulation of corporations
by Western constitutions drafted during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries illustrates how states have constitutionalized aspects of public policy. 6
Some states incorporated into their constitutions detailed legislation regulating
railroads and other corporations and protecting consumers and labor. 7 Idaho's 1889
charter declared railroads to be public highways and subjected their rates to
legislative regulation." The Montana and Wyoming Constitutions abrogated the
"fellow-servant" rule, a common-law doctrine that prevented workers from
collecting in court litigation for work-related injuries. The Wyoming charter also
forbade labor contracts that released employers from liability for injuries suffered
by workers, and the North Dakota Constitution forbade the exchange of worker
"black lists" between corporations. 9 States also created institutions designed to
monitor and, where necessary, curb illicit practices and abuses. Thus, the Idaho
Constitution established a labor commission, and the Wyoming Constitution an
inspector of mines.2" In addition, states specifically withdrew legislative authority
to enact statutes that might advantage corporate interests. The Idaho and Montana

16. A full account of the Western constitution-makers' approach to the regulation of corporations, however,
must recognize a basic ambivalence. Many convention delegates opposed stringent restrictions on corporations.
This opposition to regulation was not confined to apologists "owned" by the corporations. For if corporations were
feared as a source of corruption and oppression, their importance as a source of capital for economic development
was also recognized Constitution-makers acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, that the prosperity of their states was
inextricably linked to the success of large "foreign" corporations and feared that excessive restrictions might drive
those corporations from the state. Western delegates in particular perceived this connection and, while imposing
some restrictions, rejected more stringent ones and offered important concessions designed to attract corporations.
One such concession, incorporated into the Colorado and Idaho constitutions, permitted the taking of private
property for private as well as public use, provided that just compensation was paid. See COLO.CONST. art. II, §
14,and IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14. Such provisions supported the development of mining interests in those states,
particularly large-scale, capital-intensive quartz mining. Another significant concession was Nevada's elimination
of taxation on mines. Opponents of the exemption charged that its beneficiaries would be "foreigners-aliens, who
wish us no good." JOHNSON, supranote 11, at 224. Proponents conceded the point but successfully maintained that
taxation of mines would drive away the "foreign" capital that was essential to developing the only resource the state
possessed. These same arguments were reiterated as other conventions considered what constitutional restrictions
to place on corporations. In Montana, for example, a proposal to make corporation directors and stockholders
jointly liable for corporate debts was defeated after a delegate argued that it would "not only drive all foreign capital
invested in the state away but would prevent all future inquiries." BAKKEN, supra note 11, at 78. In Colorado,
another limitation was defeated after a delegate charged that if adopted, "not another mile of railroad [would] be
built" in the state. Id. at 77.
17. In fact, the constitutionalization of detailed economic legislation can be traced as far back as the Florida
Constitution of 1839, whose banking article was patterned after a New York statute of the previous year. The
provision was sufficiently detailed and complete that the Florida legislature did not need to enact a state banking
law. See ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 163 (1917).
18. See IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 5. For discussion of the development of the Corporations Article of the
Idaho Constitution, see DENNIS C. COLSON, IDAHO'S CONSTITUTION: THE TIE THAT BINDS 125 (1991).
19. See MONT.CONST. of 1889, art. XV, § 16; WYO. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 4, and art. X, § 4; and N.D.
CONST. of 1889, art. XVII, § 212. For a discussion of these provisions, see HICKS, supra note 11, at 92-95;
BAKKEN, supra note 11, at 80; and ROBERT B. KEITER & TIM NEwCoMB, THE WYOMING STATE CONSTmTrION:
A REFERENCE GUIDE, at 188-89 and 193-196 (1993).
20. See IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, §§ 1. 8; and WYo. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 1.For a discussion
of these provisions, see BAKKEN,supra note 11, at 79-80; COLSON, supra note 18, at 127-129; and HICKS, supra
note 11, at 92-95.
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Constitutions, for instance, both specifically forbade enactment of retroactive laws
favorable to railroads. 2 Finally, states attempted to prevent corruption of state
officials by corporate interests by establishing constitutional limitations on the gifts
and other benefits that those officials could accept from them.22 Professor Daniel
Rodriguez's impressive contribution to this Symposium addresses how the states
have constitutionalized public policy and the effects this has had on governance.2 3
His study focuses on the constitutional limitations that California has chosen to
impose on the development of local fiscal policy. However, it raises much broader
questions about the appropriate scope of constitutional limits on local fiscal
decision-making. It also raises the crucial question of how state constitutions affect
state politics by subtly analyzing how local authorities have adapted to the
constitutional limitations imposed upon them.
The recent literature on state constitutionalism has also moved beyond judicial
interpretation of state constitutions to a broader perspective on the dynamics of
constitutional change in states.2 4 Perhaps the most striking discovery has been the
ease with which state constitutions are revised and amended and the frequency with
which states have availed themselves of the formal avenues for constitutional
change.25 The Western states stand out in their unwillingness to jettison their
original constitutions---only three of the fifteen Western states have replaced their
original constitutions, and only Montana has done so since 1900.26 However, this
is not because of an unwillingness to tamper with the framers' handiwork-the
Western states have been quite willing to amend their fundamental law. In fact, over
the course of the twentieth century, the frequency of constitutional amendment in
the Western states has increased. New Mexico's experience is in many respects
typical: from 1912-1969, it adopted seventy-three amendments, but from 1969 to
1995, it adopted ninety-eight.2 ' The ratification rate for proposed amendments has
also increased. Once again, New Mexico illustrates the trend: from 1912-1945, it
ratified only thirty-five percent of proposed amendments, but from 1945-1995, it
ratified sixty-five percent.28
In their preference for amendment over revision, the Western states reflect a
century-long national trend: only twelve states have revised their constitutions since

21. See IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. Xl, § 12; and MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XV, § 13. The Idaho
provision is discussed in COLSON, supra note 18, at 125; and DONALD CROWLEY & FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE
IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 206 (1989).

22. For surveys of pertinent provisions, see HICKS, supra note 11, at 56-63, and LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 349-350 (2d ed. 1985).
23. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects,28 N.M. L. REV. 271 (1998).
24. In addition to the sources listed in note 11, see CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS INTHE STATES (G. Alan Tarr
ed., 1996).
25. For data on the frequency of state constitutional revision and amendment, see COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN LEGISLATORS' ASSOCIATION, BOOK OFTHE STATES (1997).

26. This is not for lack of effort. During the late 1960s, when Montana began considering constitutional
revision, other states in the region did so as well. In 1970, new constitutions were proposed in Idaho and Oregon,
but the voters in those states refused to ratify them. Two years later, the voters in North Dakota also
rejected a proposed constitution. We classify the following as Western states: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Hawai'i, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
27. See CHUCK SMITH, THE NEW MEXICO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 15-24 (1996).
28. See id.
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1900.29 What is atypical is the mechanism that several Western states have relied
upon for constitutional reform. In most states, amendments can only be proposed
by the state legislature." Eight of the Western states, however, permit constitutional
amendment by popular initiative as well.3 ' The effects of this Western innovation,
which has since spread eastward, have been the subject of intense debate in recent
years.3 2 Professor John Cooper's contribution to this Symposium thus performs a
major service by replacing the sometimes overheated rhetoric about the
constitutional initiative with a balanced and thoughtful evaluation of the current
debate and of the operation of the initiative in the late twentieth century.33
The states' development of distinctive institutions and practices, such as the
constitutional initiative, has stimulated research designed to address why state
constitutions differ from the Federal Constitution and from each other. Daniel
Elazar has identified patterns in state constitutional development, and some later
scholars have built upon his stimulating analysis. 4 Other studies have looked
intensively at constitutional development in a single state or sets of states.35 Patrick
Baude's interesting contribution to this Symposium demonstrates how important
such research can be.36 Western state constitutions are justly famous for their
devices for direct popular input in government: the initiative, referendum, and
recall. Indeed, as Edward S. Corwin has observed, "one of the greatest lures to the
westward movement of population was the possibility which federalism held out to
the advancing settlers of establishing their own undictated political institutions, and
endowing them with the generous powers of government for local use. 37 Professor
Baude's study shows, however, that this movement for popular involvement in
governing has its roots in a shift in political thinking that occurred as early as the
Jacksonian era, when the constitutional ideal of a negative constitution, that sought
to protect liberty by limiting government, gave way to the ideal of a positive
constitution, that sought to do so by granting power to the citizenry.

29. Georgia and Louisiana have revised their constitutions three times during the twentieth century, and
Michigan twice.
30. For data on modes of constitutional amendment, see BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 25.
31. These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and South
Dakota. Altogether, eighteen states nationwide have some version of the constitutional initiative.
32. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change and DirectDemocracy, 66 U. COLO. L REV. 143
(1995).

33. See John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions:A Concept Whose
Time Has Passed,or a Vigorous Component of ParticipatoryDemocracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M. L REV.
227 (1998). For another thoughtful account that expresses a considerably more negative assessment about the use
of the initiative for state constitutional change, see Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword:The Direct Ballot and State
Constitutionalism,28 RUTGERS L. J. 787 (1997).
34. See Daniel J. Elazar, The Principlesand Traditions Underlying American State Constitutions, 12
PUBLIUS 1 1(1982); and Kermit L Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State
Constitutions, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Paul Finkelman & Stephen

E. Gottleib eds., 1991).
35. See, in addition to the sources listed supra note 11, the volumes in REFERENCE GUIDES TO THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (G. Alan Tarr Series ed., 1990-97).
36. See Patrick Baude, A Comment on the Evolution of Direct Democracy in Western State Constitutions,
28 N.M. L. REv. 343 (1998).
37. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism,36 VA. L REV. 1, 22 (1950).
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to
His study also illustrates how constitutional ideas are transmitted from state
3" It
constitution-making.
state
in
state. This horizontal federalism has been crucial
was particularly important in the West, because Western constitution-makers had
a wide range of constitutional models on which to draw. Indeed, there is evidence
that state constitutional ideas were being developed and implemented by settlers
39
from the Eastern states on their trek West. Yet if Western constitutions were
influenced by earlier Eastern models, the relationship was reciprocal. The Eastern
states, in the words of Frederick Jackson Turner, felt the "stir in the air raised by the
Western winds of Jacksonian democracy." Thus, the winds of state constitutional
change blew not only to the West, but also back to the East.
Much work remains to be done on the patterns of interstate influence in
constitution-making. Nevertheless, the recent work of Christian Fritz has
demonstrated the thoughtfulness and care with which the Western state constitutionmakers built upon the lessons of their predecessors, and his conclusion is worth
quoting at length:
these states did not fashion their fundamental law in isolation or unaware of
constitution-making in the other states. The notion of "frontier" constitutionmaking must be regarded as a myth. Sophistication among delegates and the
work they produced varied, but in the process of drafting constitutions (and on
one occasion revising an existing constitution), delegates to Western
with broader regional and national
conventions demonstrated their connection
4
constitutionalism.
in
developments
Professor Matthew Schaefer's account of state efforts to compete for investment
through subsidies to private corporations offers an interesting complementary
perspective.4 2 As Professor Schaefer notes, most state constitutions impose
limitations on this use of state authority, in part in reaction to the misuse of such
authority during the nineteenth century. Although the Western states did not
experience such abuses, they learned from the experience of sister states and banned
public subsidy of private enterprise. This demonstrates once again the interstate
influence on state constitutions. Yet since the adoption of those provisions, many
states have reconsidered the relationship between government and private industry,
and these provisions now stand as barriers to economic development programs. His
article thus surveys alternative means, ranging from amendment to circumvention
by judicial interpretation to external intervention through the World Trade
Organization or the Federal Government. In doing so, he underscores not only the

38. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 4,at 27-29.
39. See John Phillip Reid, Governance of the Elephant: Constitutional Theory on the Overland Trail,5
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 421 (1978).
40. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER INAMERiCAN HISTORY 192 (1920).
41. Fritz, supra note 11, at 995-96.
42. See Matthew Schaefer, State Investment AttractionSubsidy Wars Resultingfrom a Prisoner'sDilemma:
The Inadequacy of State ConstitutionalSolutions and the Appropriatenessof a FederalLegislative Response, 28
N.M. L REV.303 (1998). For other treatments of these topics, see William Green, State Constitutions,Industrial
Recruitment Incentives, andJapaneseAutomobile Investment in Mid-America, 22 URB. LAW. 245 (1990); and THE
POLrICS OF INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT: JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
THE AMERICAN STATES (Ernest J. Yanarella & William C. Green eds., 1990).
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importance of state economic provisions but also the range of possible influences
on the meaning of state constitutional provisions.
We conclude by noting how the change in focus in state constitutional studies has
helped to integrate that research into the larger body of constitutional research, both
within the legal academy and in other disciplines. The concern for the constitutive
role of state constitutions parallels the recent research of Bruce Ackerman, Paul
Kahn, and Cass Sunstein. 43 The concern for constitutional dynamics beyond judicial
development coincides with the pioneering work of Sanford Levinson and others.'
The interest in state constitutions' contribution to state political development
complements important research in political science and in history.4 5 Finally, the
concern for the consequences of various constitutional arrangements is pertinent to
the new constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe and in Africa.

43. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: (1991); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELFGOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992); and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993).
44. See RESPONDING TO IMPERFECION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
45. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); and MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1977).

